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E.M.S., U.I(. AND THE DOLLAR
Currency exchange ratesinstabiLity threâtens the trade interests
of the Cormnon Market, and makes more difficuLt (but even more necessary)
the coordination of economic and monetary policy within the Comnunity
in order to secure renewed growth and to combat inflation. The fluctuations
of the dollar are Ëhe major currency problern with which Europeans have
to deal. To do so effectively, we must organise ourselves more firmly
within the European Monetary system (rus).
Recent statements by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the
Governor of the Bank of England concerning the dollar problem have been
very much in tune with the remarks being made at the same time by
Chancellor Schmidt of ÿJest Germany and Mr Mauroy, the French Prime Minister.
All have expressed concern at the prospect of further increases in U.S.
interest rates and united to warn the American authorities of the dangers
involved.
Yet the United Kingdom is still not a full member of the E.M.S. which
provides the best framework for a coflrmon European response to the dollar
instability. This is an anomal-y which should be corrected.
The volatility of dolLar interest rates is a major aspect of the
problem. They have gone up and down and up with bewildering rapidity,
and mobile funds chasing high interest rates have switched rapidly between
currencies and played havoc with exchange rates. 1980 and 1981 saw a doubling
of U.S. interest rates, a 40 per cent rise of the dollar against major
European currencies which inflicted on Europe a "dollar shock" of simiLar
economic importance to the 1980 oil shock, thus further hindering our attempts
to renew economic growth.
It is clear that none of us can afford to behave as if the effects of
our policies are exclusively domestic, and that orr prospects of fighting
inflation and umemployment are enhanced by cooperation and coordination
on monetary and economic poLicies with our major trading partners. Ttre
European Monetary System was set up in 1978 to help achieve such coordination
and to create a zoîe of monetary stability in Europe.
It has had a remarkabLe degree of success in keeping the variations of
exchange rates of participating countries within E.M.S. limits despite
turbulent monetary conditions. There have now been four adjustments of
central rates, three of them relatively minor. All of them were carried
through smoothly, promptly and without disruption of the markets. The system
has shown both a capacity to create stability, through the connnitment to
maintain parities within certain limits and the cortrnon support mechanisms
which membership involves, and its ability to respond flexibly to ne\,ÿ
developments.
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The contrast between Èhe stability of E.M.s. currencies and thefluctuations of the pound outside E.M.s. has been quite marked, andBritish exporters have suffered as a result. A wiie variety oi r"."orr"have been put forvÿard to explain U.K. non-participation - tire pound r.rastoo stron8r or too weak, or too volatile, or it had a special. petro-currency
status. It ldas argued in 1978 by Ministers that E.M.S. membership wouldhave an excessively deflationary effect on ühe U.K., and it has bàen argued
more recently that it carried inflationary dangers.
rE now seems to be more widely accepted by u.K. policy-md<ers that
exchange-rate management is not incompatible with anti-inflationary policy.
The German Federal Republic has for some time provided an example of howfirm monetary controls could be combined with à d"gr"" of exchànge rate
management to keeP inflation down. A major doctrinaL objection to U.K.
membership of E.M.S. therefore seems to have been unfounded. Ihe objectionsthat remain seem to be largely tactical - that the pound is not at its
appropriate leve1 for entry, that economic policies of E.M.S. members are
not sifficienEly coordinated, or thaÈ there are political risks involved.
I do not believe that the doctrine of "unripe time" can be invokedindefinitely and retain credibility. It is natural that rhe British
Government should be cautious given the present state of international
monetary affairs and of Èhe u.K. economy, but the absence of a major
European currency is a significant weakness in the E.M.S. and unhelpfulto the efforts to estabLish a cortrnon approach to third currencies. The
improved cooperation between British, German and French central banks andfinance ministers which has been evident in the last few weeks in theface of a renewed threat, @growth from U.S. interest rates would be al}the more effective if it was firmly based on cortrnon membership of the E.M.S.
As Europe faces up to the probl-em of how best to prepare its policies
and institutions to deal with large, continued oscilLations of interest
rates, exchange rates, and economic activity in the u.s.A., it is becomingincreasingly evident that a stronger organisation on the basis of the E.M.S.is necessary. rt is important for the u.K. not to get left out at this
new stage of development.. hle may not be on the verge of moving to a full-blown European Monetary Fund, as originally envisaged for the second stage
of E.M.S. development, but new moves for coordinaÈed dollar intervention and
wider use of the European currency unit (ttre ucu) can be envisaged.
trüe shouLd consider, for example, the replacement of existing bilateral
arrangements with a neIü swap-credit arrangement between the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund (U.U.C.F.) and the American Federal Reserve for
concerted European intervention vis-a-vis the do1lar, and the permanent
transfer of a Proportion of member state central bank reserves to EheE.M.C.F. I^Je should also seek ways of creating greater use of the ECU for
official and private transactions. An ECU travellers cheque, for example,
could have real practicaL value. These and other possibilities are being
acglvely studied and discussed, and it is not in the interests of the U.K.to stand on the sidelines. Equally it is not in the interests of an effective
European Monetary System that it should do so.
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